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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the effects of all sources of the accumulation of nonfinancial debt (hou-
sehold, corporate as well as government) on economic growth in ten euro-area countries during 
the 1980-2015 period. To this end, we make use of three models (a baseline, an asymmetric and a 
threshold model) based on the empirical growth literature augmented by debt to assess whether 
a debt change has an impact on growth over and above other determinants, treating the diffe-
rent types of borrowers separately. By exploring the time series dimension in order to properly 
account for the historical experience of each country in the sample, we aim to detect potential 
heterogeneities in the relationship across euro area countries. Our results with both the baseline 
and the asymmetric models suggest that although the effects on nonfinancial debt accumulation 
clearly differ across countries, on average, the highest marginal impact of a rise in debt corres-
ponds to the household and public sector, with an increase in private debt being more harmful 
in peripheral than in central countries; in contrast, the average effect of a rise in public debt does 
not differ between these two groups of countries. As for the effects of a debt increase beyond the 
turning point estimated in the threshold model, our findings indicate that the highest marginal 
impact corresponds to the household sector.
JEL Classification Codes: C22, D12, F33, H63, O16, O40, O52
Keywords: Public debt, household debt, nonfinancial corporate debt, economic growth, 
heterogeneity, euro area, peripheral EMU countries, central EMU countries. 
Instituto Complutense de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Campus 
de Somosaguas, Finca Mas Ferré. 28223, Pozuelo de Alarcón, Madrid, Spain.© Marta Gómez-Puig and Simón Sosvilla-Rivero
Marta Gómez-Puig, Universitat de Barcelona, Department of Economics and Riskcenter. 08034 
Barcelona, Spain. +34 934020113 / fax: +34 934039082. marta.gomezpuig@ub.edu
Simón Sosvilla-Rivero, Complutense institute for international Studies, Universidad Complutense 
de Madrid. 28223 Madrid, Spain sosvilla@ccee.ucm.es
Acknowledgements
Simón Sosvilla-Rivero thanks the members of the Department of Economics at the University of 
Bath for their hospitality during his research visit.
Funding
This paper is based on work supported by the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales [grant IEF 015/2017], 
the Banco de España [grant PR71/15-20229], the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture and 
Sport [grant PRX16/00261] and the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [grant 
ECO2016-76203-C2-2-P].
El ICEI no comparte necesariamente las opiniones expresadas en este trabajo, que son de exclusi-
va responsabilidad de sus autores.
Index
1. Introduction  5
2. Private and public indebtedness evolution in EMU countries 7
3. Literature review 13
4. Analytical framework 14
5. Data and time series properties 16
 5.1. Data   16
 5.2. Time series properties 17
6. Empirical models 17
 6.1. Baseline empirical model 17
 6.2. Asymmetric model  18
 6.3. Threshold model  18
7. Empirical results 19
 7.1. Empirical results from the baseline empirical model 20
 7.2 Empirical results from the asymmetric model  23
 7.3. Empirical results from the threshold model  26
8. Concluding remarks 30
References 33
Appendix 1 37

5out that this attitude can be attributed 
to the incentive problems that may arise 
when governments, as opposed to private 
households and companies, borrow; as 
private sector borrowers act in their 
informed self-interest, they are assumed 
to bear the consequences of their actions. 
Nevertheless, all forms of nonfinancial 
debt, when they are high and moving 
upwards, are sources of justifiable concern. 
In particular, the negative implications of 
excessive private debt (a “debt overhang”3) 
for growth and financial stability are well 
documented in the literature, underscoring 
the need for private sector deleveraging in 
some countries. 
In a series of recent papers, some authors 
[see, e.g. Schularick and Taylor (2012) and 
Jordà et al. (2016a)] demonstrate that high 
debt levels in the private sector are not 
only a good predictor of financial crises, 
but also a key determinant of the intensity 
of the ensuing recession. Moreover, high 
private debt levels can also hamper growth 
even in the absence of a financial crisis, 
since the accumulation of debt involves 
risk (International Monetary Fund, 2016a). 
As debt levels increase, borrowers’ ability 
to repay becomes progressively more 
sensitive to falls in income and sales as well 
as to increases in interest rates. In fact, high 
private debt can have a substantial adverse impact on macroeconomic performance 
and stability, as it hinders the ability of 
households to smooth their consumption 
and affects corporations’ investments. In 
addition, elevated debt levels can create 
3  A situation in which a borrower’s debt service 
exceeds its future repayment capacity.
1. Introduction 
The perspective provided by the period of 
more than seven years since the start of the 
European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) sovereign debt crisis in late 2009 
highlights the fact that its origin goes beyond 
fiscal imbalances in euro-area countries. 
Indeed, the main causes of the debt crisis 
in Europe vary according to country; 
they reflect an important interconnection 
between public and private debt and thus, 
between banking and sovereign risk (see 
Singh et al., 2016). Yet one of the lessons of 
the recent sovereign crisis in the euro-area 
is that in some countries such as Ireland or 
Spain there was next to nothing in the key 
indicators of public debt that suggested 
the imminent catastrophe; the build-up 
of financial fragility occurred in private 
sector balance sheets1.
The increase recorded by total nonfinancial 
debt in euro-area countries during the past 
three decades has been very significant, not 
only in the public sector (governments), 
but in the private sector (households 
and nonfinancial corporations) as well. 
However, while the unprecedented increase 
in public debt across EMU countries has 
raised serious concerns among economists 
about both its sustainability and its impact 
on economic growth2, they have taken 
a more nuanced position on the risks of 
private debt accumulation, despite its 
magnitude. Schularick (2013) points 
1  The important role played by private debt in 
euro-area sovereign debt crisis in some countries was already 
stressed by Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013).
2  On average, public debt reached levels about 100% 
of  Gross Domestic Product (GDP)– its highest level in 50 
years – by the end of  2013.
6(2012), Dreger and Reimers (2013), or 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2017) to 
name just a few].
Hence, this paper aims to fill the gap 
in the literature by assessing the effect 
of nonfinancial debt (households, 
nonfinancial corporations and 
governments) on economic growth in 
ten euro-area countries. To this end, we 
use a methodology that builds on Gómez-
Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2017) and 
explicitly takes into account the possible 
heterogeneity (see, e.g., Erberhart and 
Presbitero, 2015 or Chudick et al., 2017)5 
in the relationship between all forms of 
nonfinancial debt and growth across euro-
area countries. We apply this methodology 
to an examination of whether the impact of 
a debt increase on economic growth might 
differ not only depending on the source of 
debt, but also on the idiosyncrasies of each 
EMU country. 
The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 explains the rationale 
for our analysis on the basis of the results 
of some preliminary descriptive analyses 
of the evolution of public and private 
indebtedness in euro-area countries. 
Section 3 provides a literature review. 
Section 4 introduces the analytical 
framework. Section 5 presents the data 
used in the analysis and its time series 
properties. Section 6 offers our empirical 
5  Erberhart and Presbitero (2015) find some support 
for a negative relationship between public debt and long-run 
growth across countries, but no evidence for a similar (let 
alone common) debt threshold within countries. Similarly, 
Chudick et al. (2017) find no evidence for a universally 
applicable threshold effect in the relationship between public 
debt and economic growth. 
vulnerabilities or amplify and transmit 
macroeconomic and asset price shocks 
throughout the economy [see, e.g., 
Sutherland and Hoeller (2012) or Fisher 
(1931) whose theory of business cycles 
stressed that private over-indebtedness 
played a key role in generating severe 
recessions (and even depressions)]. Finally, 
spillovers from private balance sheets 
to the public sector due to government 
interventions (either direct in the form of 
targeted programs for debt restructuring, 
or indirect through the banking sector), 
may weaken the fiscal position or increase 
interest rates. All the above factors may 
compromise public debt sustainability 
(see Jarmuzek and Rozenov, 2017)4.
Despite the relevance of this issue, the 
literature examining the effects of high 
private debt levels on euro-area countries’ 
economic growth is very limited; the papers 
available do not focus exclusively on EMU 
countries but analyse the impact of private 
debt on economic growth in a broader 
group of economies, including some euro-
area members. In particular, Cecchetti et al. 
(2011) analysed the impact of both private 
and public debt on 18 OECD countries’ 
growth (10 belonging to the EMU), and 
Lombardi et al. (2017) examined the 
effects of households’ debt on economic 
growth in 54 economies (11 euro-area 
countries). Conversely, more research has 
focused on the impact of government debt 
on EMU countries’ growth [Baum et al. 
(2013), Checherita-Westphal and Rother 
4  These authors also provide a quantitative 
assessment of  the gaps between current and sustainable levels 
of  private debt, identifying the key factors that drive excessive 
borrowing.
7is shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1 contains some revealing data. 
Total nonfinancial debt as a percentage 
of GDP, as well as its components, rose 
steadily for much of the 1980-2015 period. 
Starting at a relatively modest 147 percent 
of GDP in 1980, 36 years later this figure 
had reached 304 percent of GDP in euro-
area countries. In this increase (270%), 
public debt accounts for 160 per centage 
points and private debt for 90 percentage 
literature. The two groups we consider roughly correspond 
to the distinction made by the European Commission (1995) 
between countries whose currencies continuously participated 
in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from 
its inception and which maintained broadly stable bilateral 
exchange rates with each other over the sample period, and 
those countries whose currencies either entered the ERM 
later or suspended their participation in the ERM, as well as 
fluctuating widely in value relative to the Deutschmark. These 
two groups are also roughly the ones found in Jacquemin and 
Sapir (1996), who applied multivariate analysis techniques 
to a wide set of  structural and macroeconomic indicators 
in order to form a homogeneous group of  countries. 
Moreover, these two groups are basically the same as the 
ones found in Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005) according 
to economic agents’ perceptions of  the commitment to 
maintain the exchange rate around a central parity in the 
ERM, and those identified by Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-
Zumaquero (2012) using cluster analysis when analysing 
the permanent and transitory volatilities of  EMU sovereign 
yields. More recently, Belke et al. (2017) used the same division 
of  core and peripheral countries to examine business cycle 
synchronization in the euro-area.
models. Empirical results are presented in 
Section 7. Finally, some concluding remarks 
and policy implications are provided in 
Section 8.
2. Private and public indebtedness 
evolution in EMU countries
As stated above, the past three decades have 
witnessed a remarkable rise in the total 
nonfinancial debt in euro-area economies. 
Therefore, in what follows, we provide 
some descriptive analyses of the behaviour 
of nonfinancial debt during the 1980-2015 
period in EMU countries: specifically, 
the evolution of private (households and 
nonfinancial corporations), public and 
total nonfinancial debt-to-GDP during 
this period in 10 euro-area countries6 
(both central –Austria, Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany and the Netherlands – 
and peripheral – Greece, Italy, Portugal 
and Spain) 7 jointly with its average value 
6  Ireland is not included in this analysis because the 
Central Bank of  Ireland’s Quarterly Financial Accounts only 
provide data from the first quarter of  2002. 
7  This distinction between European central and 
peripheral countries has been extensively used in the empirical 
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Figure 1. Debt-to-GDP by sector in EMU countries: 1980-2015
8(companies’ average debt ratio, 98%, is 
more than double that of families, 48%). 
Nonetheless, the growth rate of the debt 
during the period is higher for households 
(159%) than for nonfinancial corporations 
(65%). 
Therefore, the rate of increase of the 
debt-to-GDP ratio during the 1980-2015 
period is very high not only for the public 
sector but also for households8 (close to 
8  Household debt growth has normally been 
explained in the literature as a rational response of  forward 
looking agents to hump-shaped time earning profiles or to 
temporary deviations of  income from its long-run trend. So, 
mainstream theories can encompass the concept of  excessive 
points. However, the average ratio of 
indebtedness in the private sector (146%) 
is much higher (it represents around two 
thirds of the total debt ratio) than that in the 
public sector (77%) throughout the period. 
The evolution of the two components of 
private debt considered (households and 
nonfinancial corporations) is presented in 
Figure 2.
Figure 2 suggests that it is nonfinancial 
corporations rather than households that 
cause the high debt levels registered by the 
private sector during the period examined 
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Source: Cecchetti et al. (2011) extended to 2015 using AMECO and International Monetary Fund. Red 
lines correspond to the average values.
9period, it represents around 44% of total 
nonfinancial debt, followed by the public 
sector (35%) and households (21%). 
Tables 1a and 1b present the evolution of 
debt-to-GDP ratios for households, firms 
160% in both cases). Moreover, although 
nonfinancial corporations’ debt records 
a lower rate of growth throughout the 
indebtedness only supposing that agents’ maximizing 
behaviour results from a less than perfect rationality and 
foresight (see, e.g., Barnes and Young, 2003) 
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Figure 2. Private debt-to-GDP by sector in EMU countries: 1980-2015
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Table 1a indicates that, in central countries, 
the highest increase in public debt took 
place in the 1980s and 1990s (before 
and governments during the 1980-2015 
period for the EMU central and peripheral 
countries included in our sample.
Table 1a. EMU central countries sectoral debt as a percentage of GDP
Levels
 
 Changes
 
AUSTRIA 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Households 38.8 38.6 42.1 53.1 55.4 56.2 -0.4% 9.1% 26.0% 4.3% 1.4%
Nonfinancial corporations 82.2 73.9 70.2 92.4 95.0 95.9 -10.1% -5.0% 31.7% 2.8% 0.9%
General Government 35.7 59.1 75.4 75.8 78.8 82.1 65.6% 27.5% 0.6% 3.9% 4.2%
BELGIUM 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Households 30.9 33.2 35.5 49.1 48.4 48.8 7.5% 6.9% 38.5% -1.4% 0.8%
Nonfinancial corporations 64.8 75.3 100.4 165.4 174.6 179.8 16.3% 33.3% 64.7% 5.6% 3.0%
General Government 61.5 140.5 126.8 93.9 99.3 100.0 128.5% -9.7% -25.9% 5.8% 0.7%
FINLAND 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Households 28.5 47.2 33.1 64.5 68.9 73.3 65.2% -29.8% 94.8% 6.9% 6.4%
Nonfinancial corporations 97.8 99.3 106.5 139.1 142.4 148.5 1.6% 7.2% 30.6% 2.4% 4.3%
General Government 16.3 22.8 76.5 40.0 52.3 60.8 40.5% 234.9% -47.7% 30.9% 16.3%
FRANCE 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Households 26.7 44.7 44.9 67.1 66.4 63.1 67.5% 0.5% 49.4% -1.0% -5.0%
Nonfinancial corporations 96.9 103.4 110.7 149.4 153.3 151.7 6.7% 7.0% 35.0% 2.7% -1.0%
General Government 34.1 45.8 74.3 76.6 87.3 93.2 34.6% 62.2% 3.0% 14.0% 6.8%
GERMANY 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Households 56.3 59.0 69.6 64.3 67.3 65.8 4.73% 18.05% -7.54% 4.55% -2.25%
Nonfinancial corporations 44.6 34.2 77.5 100.8 103.3 104.9 -23.32% 126.58% 30.16% 2.49% 1.54%
General Government 31.2 41.6 62.3 70.6 79.2 69.5 33.38% 49.50% 13.34% 12.21% -12.17%
NETHERLANDS 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Households 41.0 45.7 74.7 126.8 119.7 128.2 11.6% 63.3% 69.7% -5.6% 7.1%
Nonfinancial corporations 93.6 112.2 118.1 117.5 128.5 127.9 19.8% 5.3% -0.5% 9.3% -0.5%
General Government 64.6 97.3 74.2 55.4 64.3 62.8 50.7% -23.7% -25.4% 16.1% -2.4%
the launch of the euro), while during the 
decade preceding the onset of the crisis 
(from 1999 until 2009) the highest rate of 
growth was recorded by private debt (both 
households and nonfinancial corporations) 
rather than public debt. 
A similar pattern is observed in most 
peripheral countries (see Table 1b), where 
public debt presents a noticeable upward 
trend during the two decades preceding 
the introduction of the common currency. 
This led to the high values registered by 
the sovereign debt-to-GDP ratio in 2009 
coinciding with the outbreak of the crisis 
(120%, 106% and 80% in Greece, Italy 
and Portugal respectively)9. However, 
during the first ten years of monetary 
union, the rate of increase of private debt 
also overtook that of the public sector 
in peripheral countries. In particular, 
households’ debt registered a rate of 
increase that ranges from 54% in Portugal 
to 223% in Greece, while nonfinancial 
9  It is noticeable that in other EMU peripheral 
countries such as Spain, with a debt-to-GDP ratio in 2009 
close to 50%, considerably below the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) ceiling, it seems that it was private rather than 
public debt that triggered the crisis.
11
downward trend registered by sovereign 
bond yields, long-term interest rates also 
converged to very low values, fostering a 
credit expansion in the nonfinancial private sector11. So, in 2015 about two-thirds of 
total euro-area countries’ nonfinancial 
debt had its origin in the private sector12.
In addition, Table 1b also indicates that 
private debt also recorded an important 
surge in some EMU peripheral countries, 
which had largely been ignored during the 1999-2009 period 
(see Gómez-Puig et al., 2014).
11 Alves and Pereira (2017) examine the dramatic 
indebtedness increase among households in Portugal, 
detecting a structural break around 1992, which may 
correspond to the signing of  the Maastricht Treaty which 
ultimately led to this decline in interest rates and consequently 
the increase in indebtedness. 
12 A similar pattern has been registered by non-
EMU countries. According to the International Monetary 
Fund (2016a), the global gross debt of  the nonfinancial 
sector — comprising the general government, households, 
and nonfinancial firms — has more than doubled in nominal 
terms since the turn of  the century, reaching $152 trillion in 
2015 – i.e., which 225 per cent of  world GDP. About two-
thirds of  this debt consists of  liabilities of  the private sector. 
corporations’ debt recorded its highest 
rate of increase in Spain (83%), followed 
by Greece, Portugal and Italy. 
Therefore, during the 2000s, on the eve of 
the recent sovereign debt crisis caused by 
the globalization of banking, rapid financial 
liberalization and a period of easy access to 
credit, nonfinancial private debt increased 
substantially in EMU Member States (both 
central and peripheral). The situation 
had become clearly unsustainable by the 
onset of the financial crisis. It is noticeable 
that during the first ten years of the euro, 
not only did exchange risk disappeare, 
but credit risk also fell progressively as 
markets perceived sovereign markets as 
a single unit, dismissing macroeconomic 
imbalances within euro-area countries 
and the possibility that governments 
might default10. As a result, along with the 
10  Nevertheless, with the financial crisis the picture 
changed completely and sovereign long term interest rates 
rose sharply. Indeed, the crisis put the spotlight on the 
macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within EMU countries 
Table 1b. EMU peripheral countries sectoral debt as a percentage of GDP
 
 Levels 
 
 
Changes
  
GREECE 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Households 7.8 8.7 16.1 52.1 50.5 47.3 11.6% 84.9% 222.6% -2.9% -6.5%
Nonfinancial corporations 60.2 46.7 44.7 65.5 65.8 62.0 -22.5% -4.2% 46.5% 0.4% -5.8%
General Government 25.5 82.9 111.6 120.1 159.2 173.8 224.7% 34.7% 7.6% 32.6% 9.2%
ITALY 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Households 6.3 20.5 27.2 50.5 50.5 51.3 224.8% 32.3% 86.0% 0.0% 1.6%
Nonfinancial corporations 47.4 63.7 92.2 124.6 121.9 128.0 34.2% 44.8% 35.1% -2.1% 5.0%
General Government 54.0 92.8 130.4 105.9 118.2 125.7 72.0% 40.4% -18.8% 11.6% 6.3%
PORTUGAL 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Households 15.4 21.8 63.8 98.1 102.6 99.0 41.7% 193.1% 53.8% 4.5% -3.4%
Nonfinancial corporations 94.3 48.7 99.2 142.5 143.2 146.7 -48.4% 103.7% 43.7% 0.4% 2.5%
General Government 35.8 68.4 62.7 80.0 124.7 128.2 91.3% -8.3% 27.5% 55.9% 2.8%
SPAIN 1980 1990 1999 2009 2012 2015 1980-1990 1990-1999 1999-2009 2009-2012 2012-2015
Households 24.1 39.7 48.5 85.7 95.0 88.3 64.5% 22.2% 76.7% 10.9% -7.1%
Nonfinancial corporations 118.5 93.2 103.8 189.7 185.2 182.6 -21.4% 11.5% 82.7% -2.4% -1.4%
General Government 27.5 49.0 74.3 50.6 83.9 95.3 78.1% 51.8% -31.9% 65.9% 13.6%
Source: Cecchetti et al. (2011) extended to 2015 using AMECO; http://www.bis.org/publ/work352_data.xls
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key risk factor for public finances and 
have fostered the tight link between the 
private credit cycle and the fiscal cycle. 
Fourth, since high debt levels in the private 
sector are a determining element of the 
strength of the following recession (see 
Jordà et al., 2016a), examining their nexus 
with economic growth emerges as a key 
topic that deserves economists’ attention 
(especially in euro-area countries with their 
fierce banking, sovereign and economic 
crisis). Finally, today’s unprecedented 
indebtedness levels (in both the public 
and the private sector) in EMU countries 
should be a matter of concern as long as 
the expected normalization in the future 
European Central Bank’s monetary policy 
could push up long-term interest rates. In 
that case, interest expenses on the debt 
would start to increase borrowers’ risk 
and eventually lead to a debt overhang, 
with the subsequent adverse effect on 
economic growth. 
We should stress that Ireland’s debt 
evolution is not included in Figures 1 
and 2 and Tables 1a and 1b because 
private debt data are only available in 
this country from the first quarter of 
2002 onwards. So, despite the relevance 
of private debt in the Irish economy (see 
Lydon and McIndoe-Calder, 2017), due to 
these data restrictions, in this paper we 
analyse the impact of nonfinancial debt 
(households, nonfinancial corporations 
and governments) on economic growth in 
ten EMU countries (excluding Ireland from 
the analysis) during the 1980-2015 period. 
not only during the 2000s but also during 
the two decades before the start of the 
monetary union. In particular, during the 
1980s the rate of growth of households’ 
debt was 225% in Italy and 65% in Spain, 
while it increased notably in Portugal 
and Greece (193% and 85% respectively) 
during the 1990s. In that decade, firms’ debt 
also registered notable rises in Portugal 
and Italy (104% and 45% respectively). 
Finally, of course, ex post, the severe 
financial crisis and economic recession 
would damage public finances via crashing 
revenues and rising cyclical expenditures, 
and consequently fuelling the public debt 
increase. Hence, during the 2009-2012 
period, the public sector registered the 
highest rise in debt levels in all peripheral 
countries, with especially high increases in 
Spain (66%) and in Portugal (56%), while 
private debt began a deleveraging trend.
All in all, some interesting insights can be 
drawn from Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 1a 
and 1b, and they in fact motivate the analysis 
presented in this paper. First, during the 
last three decades debt evolution was 
significant not only in the public sector but 
in the private sector as well, providing one 
reason why economists and policy makers 
should take private sector indebtedness 
as seriously as public indebtedness. 
Second, private sector credit growth, not 
public debt accumulation, provides the 
key to understanding the build-up of the 
sovereign debt crisis in some euro-area 
countries. Third, the tendency to socialize 
the losses from private sector financial 
crisis has grown; they have become a 
13
and corporate leverage using data on 
40 countries during the 1990-2014 
period; and Uusküla (2016) examined 
the relationship between more than 30 
macroeconomic variables and debt-to-
GDP ratios for household, nonfinancial 
corporation and aggregate debt in a panel 
of European Union countries. 
Another strand of literature examines the 
effects that the generalized and necessary 
deleveraging process currently taking place 
in the private sector may have on economic 
activity [see Crowe et al. (2011), Ruscher 
and Wolff (2013), Cuerpo et al. (2015) or 
Kuvshinov et al. (2016)]. Other authors 
(see, e. g., Bernardini and Peersman, 2015; 
Klein, 2016) have shown that the effects of 
fiscal consolidations crucially depend on 
the level of private indebtedness (mostly 
household leveraging), whereas the state 
of the business cycle and the level of 
public debt play only a minor role in the 
effectiveness of fiscal policy13. 
Finally, some recent contributions have 
pointed to the important role of private 
debt for the propagation and amplification 
of shocks, since a high level of indebtedness 
may render the economy more vulnerable 
to negative shocks than otherwise. Mian 
and Sufi (2017) showed that an increase 
in the household debt to GDP predicts 
lower subsequent GDP growth and higher 
13  Additionally, Klein and Winkler (2017) 
provide empirical evidence supporting the view that fiscal 
consolidations lead to a strong and persistent increase in 
income inequality during periods of  private debt overhang.
14 For example, it is well documented that in the U.S. during 
the financial crisis, the households that took subprime loans 
were much more prone to foreclosure and bankruptcy (Li and 
White, 2009).  
3. Literature review
Until the recent crisis, economists worried 
mainly about public debt, not about private 
debt. The warning signs of increased 
private leverage in the run-up to the crisis 
of 2008 were largely ignored. However, as 
shown in Figures 1 and 2, the increase in 
euro-area debt levels during the last 36 
years was due to the behaviour not only 
of the public sector, but of the private 
sector as well, in particular of households. 
Moreover, firms’ debt, which shows the 
highest share of total debt throughout the 
period, represents an important potential 
burden for the recovery of the economies. 
As it turns out, in 2015 only about one 
third of total debt in EMU countries 
corresponds to public debt accumulation. 
In other words, the overwhelming share of 
the debt increase has been due to higher 
borrowing by households and nonfinancial 
companies. 
Therefore, economists should not 
disregard private sector leveraging; in 
fact they should pay as much attention 
to it as they do to public debt. The 
literature on this topic is still scarce, 
but not non-existent. One strand of the 
literature has focused on the relationship 
between the different forms of debt. 
Angeletos et al. (2016) highlighted that 
government debt expansions significantly 
influence households’ financial condition; 
investigating the impact of government 
debt on corporate financing decisions, 
Demirci et al. (2017) found a negative 
relation between government debt 
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governments) and on the idiosyncrasies of 
the different countries. 
4. Analytical framework
Econometrics is concerned with drawing 
inferences about economic relationships 
from observed data using economic 
models that are inevitably incomplete 
characterizations of the complicated reality 
of economic life. Therefore, the crucial 
decision in all empirical studies concerns 
the set of variables for which observations 
should be collected and then analysed in 
order to describe the salient features of 
the economic world. Following both the 
relevant economic theory and the previous 
empirical knowledge, our analytical 
strategy incorporates the specification and 
estimation of a growth equation based on 
the empirical growth literature (e.g., Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) augmented by 
debt to assess whether the latter has an 
impact on growth over and above other 
determinants.
The initial empirical specification is 
derived from the neoclassical growth 
model, stating that the growth rate of real 
per capita GDP (gt) for a given country is 
given by:
1
1
n
t t i it t t
i
g y X dα γ δ β ε−
=
= + + + +∑    
(1)where yt-1 is the logarithm of initial real 
per capita GDP (to capture the “catch-up 
effect” or conditional convergence of the 
economy to its steady state), Xit (i=1, …, n) 
is a set of explanatory regressors and dt is 
unemployment; Jordà et al. (2016b) 
found that more mortgage-intensive 
credit expansions tend to be followed by 
deeper recessions and slower recoveries, 
but that this effect is not present for non-
mortgage credit booms14; using data for 31 
OECD and 20 emerging market countries 
Randveer et al. (2011) found that a higher 
level of private debt before a recession is 
correlated with lower economic growth 
after the economic slowdown has finished; 
using microeconomic data for the United 
States Garriga et al. (2017) reported that 
most forms of private debt (mortgages, 
credit card debt, and auto loans) had 
significant boom-bust cycles; and Guerini 
et al. (2017) investigated the causal effects 
of public and private debts on U.S. output 
dynamics. 
Nonetheless, the literature that has centred 
on the effects of high private debt levels 
on euro-area countries’ economic growth 
is very limited and only includes papers 
that, instead of focusing on EMU countries, 
analyse the impact in a broader group 
that includes some euro-area members 
[Cecchetti et al. (2011) or Lombardi et 
al. (2017)]. Therefore, this paper aims 
to fill the gap existing in the literature 
by examining the effect of all sources of 
nonfinancial debt (private and public) on 
economic growth in a sample of ten EMU 
countries which have recently endured a 
severe financial and economic crisis. Our 
objective is to analyse whether the effect 
of debt accumulation depends on the 
source of debt (households, companies or 
14 
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(Mankiw et al., 1992), while still others 
present evidence of a positive relationship 
(Sachs and Warner, 1997). The population 
growth rate, then, has been found to exhibit 
either a positive or a negative relationship 
with economic growth. 
As for the relationship between economic 
growth and savings, according to many 
literature reports a positive and statistically 
significant impact of GSt on economic 
growth is expected, since increased 
savings may stimulate economic growth 
through increased investment (Keynes, 
1936). This approach is supported by 
the growth models proposed by Harrod 
(1939), Domar (1946) and Solow (1956).  
HKt is included to reflect the notion that 
countries with an abundance of human 
capital are more likely to be able to attract 
investors, absorb ideas from the rest 
of the world, and engage in innovation 
activities (Grossman and Helpman, 1991). 
While some studies have found a positive 
relationship between human capital and 
economic growth (Radelet et al., 2001), 
others have found a negative relationship 
(Barro, 2003). Consequently, the effect 
of human capital on economic growth is 
expected to be either positive or negative. 
OPENt is posited to boost productivity 
through transfers of knowledge and 
efficiency gains (Seghezza and Baldwin, 
2008). Since most of the empirical 
literature [Romer (1992), Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995), or Edwards (1998), among 
others] provides evidence of the positive 
impact of openness on growth, a positive 
sign is expected for this variable. Finally, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio. Following Cecchetti 
et al. (2011), household (hdt), corporate 
(cdt) and public (pdt) debt are treated 
separately.
Regarding Xt, we consider a set of 
explanatory variables that have been 
shown to be consistently associated 
with growth in the literature: population 
growth rate (POPGRt); the ratio of gross 
savings to GDP (GSt); life expectancy at 
birth, a proxy for the level of human capital 
(HKt)15; openness to trade, measured by 
the absolute sum of exports and imports 
over GDP (OPENt); and CPI inflation, a 
measure of macroeconomic instability and 
uncertainty (INFt).
In the economic growth literature, the 
rate of growth of labour used in the 
production process is a key determinant of 
growth (Solow, 1956 or Frankel, 1962). So 
POPGRt is used to proxy country size and 
the rate of labour growth. The empirical 
evidence suggests that the relationship 
between population and economic growth 
is mixed and varies between countries. 
Some empirical studies suggest that the 
relationship is negative and insignificant 
(Levine and Renelt, 1992); others find 
a negative and significant association 
15  This proxy is also used by Sachs and Warner 
(1997). Other proxies commonly used for human capital such 
as years of  secondary education and school enrollment in 
secondary were only available from 1980. Additionally, the 
proxy years of  secondary education did not change during 
the sample period. As shown in Jayachandran and Lleras-
Muney (2009), longer life expectancy encourages human 
capital accumulation, since a longer time horizon increases 
the value of  investments that pay out over time. Moreover, 
better health and education are complementary with longer 
life expectancy (Becker, 2007). Indeed, life expectancy at 
birth correlates strongly with the index of  human capital 
per person provided by the Penn World Table (version 8.0, 
Feenstra et al., 2013), based on years of  schooling (Barro and 
Lee, 2013) and returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 1994).
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capital (more productive forms), and 
Dotsey and Sarte (2000), who contend 
that inflation makes the return to money 
balances uncertain and reduces the demand 
for real money balances and consumption; 
this increases precautionary savings and, 
in response to higher anticipated inflation, 
the investment pool enhances economic 
growth.
5. Data and time series properties
5.1. Data  
As mentioned above, we use annual data for 
ten EMU countries: both central (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and 
the Netherlands) and peripheral countries 
(Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). We use 
long spans of data covering the period 
1980-2015 (i.e., a total of 36 annual 
observations) to explore the dimension 
of historical specificity and to capture 
the underlying relationship between the 
variables under study.
To maintain as much homogeneity as 
possible for a sample of ten countries over 
the course of five decades, we use the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators16 
as our primary source, supplemented 
with data from Cecchetti et al. (2011), the 
European Commission’s AMECO database 
and the International Monetary Fund 
(International Financial Statistics 2016b). 
As stated above, we use per capita GDP at 
2010 market prices, population growth 
rate, the ratio of gross savings to GDP, an 
index of human capital, openness to trade 
16  http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators
with regard to INFt, it has been argued 
that inflation is a good macroeconomic 
indicator of how the government manages 
the economy [see Fischer (1993) or 
Barro (2003), just to name a few] and 
that low inflation brings about economic 
efficiency because, through the price 
mechanism, economies are able to allocate 
scarce resources to their best economic 
use (World Bank, 1990). Nonetheless, the a priori expectation may be either a 
positive or negative association between 
inflation and economic growth. This 
presumable uncertain effect is supported 
by the different arguments presented in 
the literature regarding the relationship 
between these two variables. While some 
authors defend a negative relationship, 
others support a positive one. The former 
group includes De Gregorio (1993), who 
suggests that inflation can increase the cost 
of capital, reducing capital accumulation 
and lowering its productivity, and thus 
inhibiting long-run growth; Friedman 
(1977), who conjectures that inflation 
uncertainty would reduce the effectiveness 
of the price mechanism to coordinate 
economic activities, decreasing the output 
growth rate; and Fischer (1993) or Bruno 
and Easterly (1998), who stress the 
negative relationship between inflation 
and growth especially via their impact on 
the efficiency of physical capital. On the 
other hand, the latter group includes Tobin 
(1965), who argues that higher anticipated 
inflation can increase capital per head as 
households shift their (portfolio) assets 
away from real money balances (non-
interest-bearing money) toward real 
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Cheung and Chinn’s (1997) suggestion, we 
confirm these results using the KPSS tests 
(Kwiatkowski et al. 1992), where the null is 
a stationary process against the alternative of a unit root18. 
6. Empirical models
6.1. Baseline empirical model
Given that our dependent variable is 
stationary (i.e., its statistical properties 
such as mean, variance, autocorrelation, 
etc., remain constant over time), we cannot 
explain it with non-stationary variables 
(whose statistical properties change over 
time). Additionally, if the variables in the 
regression model are not stationary, then 
the standard assumptions for asymptotic 
analysis will not be valid and we cannot 
undertake hypothesis tests about the 
regression parameters. Therefore, by 
differencing the non-stationary variables we transform them into stationary 
variables19.
As a result of the time series properties of 
our data, the baseline empirical model is 
modified as follows: 
(2)
where Δ denotes the first difference 
18  The results are not shown here due to space 
restrictions but are available from the authors upon request.
19  Note that if  the public debt-to-GDP ratio series 
contains a unit root, that would imply that the results of  many 
previous studies (some of  which had been used as a basis for 
policy recommendations) are spurious. 
and consumer price inflation. The precise 
definitions and sources of the variables are 
presented in Appendix 1.
5.2. Time series properties
Our approach focuses on time series 
analyses of yearly data for individual countries which can help us to document 
the possible differences in their 
experiences. This approach is likely to 
provide an accurate empirical estimate of 
the underlying debt-growth nexus in EMU 
countries.
Since the appropriate econometric 
treatment of a model depends crucially 
on the pattern of stationarity and non-
stationarity of the variables under study, 
before carrying out the estimation we test 
for the order of integration of the variables 
by means of the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) tests. This step is necessary 
to ensure that all our variables in the 
regression equation have the same order 
of integration, given the non-stationarity 
that most macroeconomic data exhibit. The 
results decisively reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root at conventional significance 
levels for gt, INFt, POPGRt and GSt (indicating 
that they are stationary in levels, i.e., I(0)), 
while we do not reject the null for yt, hdt, cdt, 
pdt, OPENt and HKt (suggesting that these 
variables can be treated as first-difference 
stationary, i.e., I(1))17. Then, following 
17  These results (which are not shown here in order 
to save space, but are available from the authors upon 
request) were confirmed using Phillips-Perron (1998) unit 
root tests controlling for serial correlation and the Elliott, 
Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) Point Optimal and Ng and 
Perron (2001) unit root tests for testing non-stationarity 
against the alternative of  high persistence. These additional 
results are also available from the authors.
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specification to capture this possibility:
 
(4)where I is an indicator function that takes 
the value 1 if the condition is fulfilled 
(i.e., if Δ is positive or negative) and zero 
otherwise. The indicator variable has 
the effect of splitting the variation of 
debt variable into two, allowing for an 
asymmetric response of growth to debt 
accumulation and relief.
6.3. Threshold model 
Identifying a threshold effect for each 
economy under study would inform policy 
makers of the presence of a country-specific 
tipping point, which would be useful 
information for guiding macroeconomic 
policies and fiscal adjustments21. To this 
end, we use the following alternative 
specification:
 
(5)
21  Baum et al. (2013), Checherita-Westphal and 
Rother (2012), Dreger and Reimers (2013), Antonakakis 
(2014) and Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2017) have 
found that, for the euro-area, the relationship between 
public debt and growth is characterized by the presence of  a 
threshold above which debt starts to have a negative effect on 
economic growth. Caution should be taken when comparing 
results with those presented in Baum et al. (2013), Checherita-
Westphal and Rother (2012), Dreger and Reimers (2013) or 
Antonakakis (2014) due to the fact that these papers adopt 
a panel data analysis and use the debt-to-GDP ratio as the 
primary variable of  interest.
operator. 
Note that model (2) is quite different 
from model (1), which is commonly used 
in the literature, especially regarding the 
variables yt-1, HK, OPEN and d, since we find 
that they are non-stationary and therefore 
enter our model in first differences. As 
argued in Asimakopoulos and Karavias 
(2016), by rewriting equation (1) as (3)
1
1 1
l l
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t t i it i it t t
i i
g y X X dα γ δ δ β ε−
= =
= + + + + +∑ ∑      
(3)
(where sitX  and 
ns
itX denote the stationary 
and non-stationary explanatory variables 
respectively), we can compare (3) with our 
equation (2), which has 1 1t tg y− −= ∆ instead of 1ty − , td∆  instead of td  and nsitX∆  instead of nsitX as explanatory variables due to 
non-stationarity. The interpretation of the 
estimated parameters is the same in both 
models, but that ofφ , 2 ,δ 3δ and β changes.
6.2. Asymmetric model 
We proceed further by exploring the 
possibility of an asymmetric effect on 
positive and negative debt variation on 
economic growth for each country20. We 
use the following alternative empirical 
20  For example, Eberhardt and Presbitero (2015) 
assess asymmetry in the long- and/or short-run relationship 
between public debt and growth in a large panel of  countries 
in order to reflect the conclusions of  the well-established 
literature on the asymmetric effects of  fiscal policy in 
advanced economies (see, Sutherland, 1997; and Perotti, 
1999). Nevertheless, their methodological approach is 
different from the one implemented in this paper, since we 
adopt a times series analysis instead of  a panel data approach 
and we deal appropriately with the different order of  
integration of  the relevant variables, using changes in debt-to-
GDP ratio as the primary variable of  interest. 
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all the variables likely to be relevant, and 
lags long enough to be able to capture 
a constant parameter representation, 
standard testing procedures eliminate 
statistically insignificant variables. 
Diagnostic tests check the validity of the 
reductions, ensuring a consistent final 
selection which produces a parsimonious 
and interpretable econometric model that 
is data- admissible, presents well-behaved 
residuals and uses conditioning variables 
that are weakly exogenous (see Faust 
and Whiteman, 1997)23. This method has 
proved useful in practice for selecting 
empirical economic models (see Hendry, 
2000).  
Given the potential for endogeneity of the 
explanatory variables, we use two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable 
techniques to estimate the finally selected 
model. In the case of the threshold model, 
we use the 2SLS estimator proposed by 
Caner and Hansen (2004). Following common practice with macroeconomic 
data, we use lagged terms of regressors as 
instruments. 
Recall that, in order to assess the 
differences between types of borrowers, 
household, corporate and government 
debt (hdt, cdt and pdt, respectively) are 
treated separately.
23  Phillips (1988) contends that the general-to-
specific methodology performs a set of  corrections that make 
it an optimal procedure under weak exogeneity.
where I is an indicator function that takes 
the value 1 if the condition is fulfilled (i.e., if td  is either below or above a specific 
threshold value *d ) and zero otherwise. 
In this case, the indicator variable has 
the effect of splitting the variation of debt 
variable into two, allowing for the impact 
to differ above and below the threshold. 
Following the common practice in the 
empirical literature, the assignment to one 
or the other regime is determined by the 
debt-to-GDP ratio, allowing us to compare 
our results with previous papers which 
have adopted this ratio as the primary 
variable of interest. We evaluate all 
possible values for *,d selecting for each 
country the value that minimizes the sum 
of squared residuals from the regression 
as the relevant one.
7. Empirical results22
In order to assess whether the proposed 
models are tentatively admissible 
(i.e., consistent with the data and with 
economic theory), we use a data-based 
method for obtaining a parsimony 
representation of the data-generating 
process: the general-to-specific approach 
(Hendry, 1995). In this approach, the 
modeller simplifies an initially general 
model that adequately characterizes 
the empirical evidence within his or her 
theoretical framework. Starting from a 
general unrestricted model that contains 
22  In each model, we focus our comments on 
the variation in debt to investigate its effect on growth, 
summarizing the results by pointing out the main regularities. 
The reader is asked to browse through Tables 2 to 4 to find 
evidence for particular country of  her/his interest and for a 
detailed account of  the impact of  other explanatory variables 
on the growth rate. 
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since the marginal impact ranges from 
-0.34 in Greece to -0.003 in Germany and, 
on average, the influence is also higher in 
peripheral (-0.19) than in central countries 
(-0.09). However, even though the reaction 
to a public debt increase also differs across 
EMU countries (it ranges from -0.46 in 
Finland to -0.002 in Austria), the average 
value is very similar (close to -0.2) in 
central and peripheral countries. 
Summing up, the results from the baseline 
model suggest that although the effects 
on nonfinancial debt accumulation clearly 
differ across countries, on average, the 
highest marginal impact of a debt rise 
corresponds to the household and public 
sector. Furthermore, an increase in private 
debt (both households and companies) is more harmful in peripheral than in central 
countries, while the average effect of a 
rise in public debt does not differ between 
these two groups of countries. 
Finally, as can be seen in Panel B in Tables 
2a and 2b, the estimated models seem to 
pass diagnostic tests such as normality 
of error term, second-order residual 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity 
(χ2N, χ2SC and χ
2
H
 respectively). The overall 
regression fit is satisfactory, as measured by 
the adjusted R2 value (ranging from 0.5404 
to 0.7575 for central EMU countries and 
from 0.5700 to 0.6979 for peripheral EMU 
countries). Therefore, our econometric 
modelling seems to have identified sensible 
and interpretable relationships between 
the economic variables under study.
7.1. Empirical results from the baseline 
empirical model
Panel A in Tables 2a and 2b reports the 
results for peripheral and central countries 
respectively. All explanatory variables turn 
out to be significant and their signs are 
in concordance with the literature. The 
degree of country’s openness to trade, 
the proxy used to measure human capital, 
population growth and the ratio of gross 
savings to GDP have a positive impact 
on real GDP per capita growth, while the 
inflation rate and the ratio of debt over 
GDP exert a negative effect24. 
Some interesting insights emerge from 
the results presented in Tables 2 when 
analysing the effect of a debt increase in 
the three different sectors on per capita 
GDP growth. We observe that, on average 
in the ten countries under study, the 
highest marginal impact of a debt rise 
corresponds to the household and public 
sector (-0.2), the marginal effect of an 
increase in nonfinancial corporations’ 
debt being much lower (-0.1). However, 
there are important differences across 
countries. If there is an increase in 
households’ debt, the estimated marginal 
effect on growth ranges from -0.54 in 
Greece to -0.03 in the Netherlands, and the 
response is higher in peripheral (-0.27) 
than in central countries (-0.17). A similar 
pattern is found when analysing the effect 
of an increase in nonfinancial firms’ debt, 
24   As pointed out in Section 4, a positive effect was 
expected for the variable measuring openness to trade and 
the ratio of  gross savings to GDP, while a negative effect was 
expected for the ratio of  debt to GDP. However, according to 
the literature the expected effect of  human capital, population 
growth and inflation rate might be either positive or negative.
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Table 2a. Baseline empirical model. Central countries
Panel A: Estimation results
AT BE FI FR GE NL
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd
gt-1
INFt
ΔHKt
ΔOPENt
POPGROt
GSt
Δdt
0.3738
(2.7455)
-0.1081
(-3.1421)
0.0420
(2.6325)
0.2346
(4.3356)
0.0718
(2.8345)
0.0541
(2.7691)
-0.2487
(-2.9506)
0.4390
(3.4691)
-0.1472
(-3.1321)
1.0005
(2.8281)
0.2832
(5.5322)
0.3350
(2.7299)
0.0670
(2.8477)
-0.1880
(-3.1881)
0.3825
(2.9431)
-0.0803
(-2.9393)
0.2335
(2.8713)
0.2128
(3.1009)
0.0112
(2.9144)
0.0457
(2.8635)
-0.0023
(-2.8425)
0.0758
(2.9536)
-0.2507
(-2.8713)
1.7608
(2.8764)
0.1292
(4.7738)
1.990
(2.7953)
0.1051
(3.4975)
-0.0463
(-2.9636)
0.1168
(2.9368)
-0.2676
(-3.1538)
1.5789
(2.8581)
0.1373
(4.9634)
1.8297
(2.7613)
0.1087
(3.6877)
-0.0381
(-2.9102)
0.0597
(2.7498)
-0.0559
(-2.9565)
1.9230
(2.8369)
0.0925
(4.1412)
1.5474
(2.9185)
0.0826
(3.2412)
-0.1116
(-2.8738)
0.0171
(2.9744)
-0.2528
(-2.8492)
1.0024
(2.8759)
0.2616
(3.2038)
13.0941
(3.2038)
0.2712
(4.8230)
-0.3332
(-2.9411)
0.0376
(3.2888)
-0.2941
(-2.9429)
1.0714
(2.7942)
0.4124
(3.2587)
10.8246
(3.0170)
0.2233
(4.1510)
-0.1106
(-2.9870)
0.3010
(2.9865)
-0.2053
(-2.9846)
0.2321
(2.9166)
0.2762
(3.3701)
4.8721
(2.7637)
0.1804
(4.1991)
-0.4605
(-2.9791)
0.4555
(2.9320)
-0.0040
(-2.8654)
1.6952
(2.7952)
0.2255
(3.0763)
1.4546
(2.8461)
0.0096
(2.9401)
-0.0930
(-2.9394)
0.4886
(3.3858)
-0.0335
(-2.8915)
1.5914
(2.8629)
0.2831
(3.7864)
1.8213
(2.8325)
0.0126
(2.8811)
-0.1209
(-2.9864)
0.1457
(2.9316)
-0.0029
(-2.7982)
0.8473
(2.9903)
0.1514
(3.1191)
0.4563
(2.8311)
0.0753
(2.9437)
-0.2839
(-2.9559)
0.1694
(3.1397)
-0.2054
(-2.9596)
1.8120
(2.8708)
0.3976
(5.8877)
0.8033
(2.8701)
0.0005
(2.9215)
-0.2857
(-2.9670)
0.2811
(3.1121)
-0.1510
(-2.9126)
1.5990
(2.9422)
0.4254
(5.5711)
1.0290
(2.9256)
0.0050
(2.9211)
-0.0028
(-2.8697)
0.1596
(2.9443)
-0.1951
(-2.9772)
1.3715
(2.8306)
0.3925
(5.3482)
0.9958
(2.9860)
0.0110
(2.8454)
-0.1565
(-2.9738)
0.5363
(3.7445)
-0.4289
(-2.9385)
0.5682
(2.8409)
0.1266
(3.1494)
0.9221
(2.9549)
0.0460
(3.3748)
-0.0301
(-2.9583)
0.5509
(3.8854)
-0.4152
(-3.1020)
0.3034
(2.9219)
0.1152
(2.9384)
0.7040
(2.7812)
0.0490
(2.9466)
-0.0677
(-2.9786)
0.4737
(3.3240)
-0.3693
(-2.9176)
0.7281
(2.9562)
0.1126
(2.9783)
0.6100
(2.7723)
0.0586
(2.8070)
-0.1084
(-2.8638)
Panel B: Model Diagnostics
Adjusted R2
DW Test
χ2N 
χ2SC
χ2H
0.6054
2.1267
0.3646
[0.8334]
0.6832
[0.5138]
11.4297
[0.1209]
0.6247
2.1809
0.3913 
[0.8223]
0.7820 
[0.4680]
5.7638 
[0.5676]
0.5565
2.1792
0.3634
[0.8338]
0.5616
[0.5771]
11.3543
[0.1239]
0.6154
2.2069
0.7268
[0.6953]
1.5286
[0.2357]
3.9147
[0.7896]
0.6247
2.1715
0.3995 
[0.8190]
2.1435
[0.1375]
4.1806 
[0.7588]
0.6507
2.1661
0.8038
[0.6690]
1.0074
[0.3801]
5.6342
[0.5831]
0.6335
2.2949
2.2910 
[0.5244]
0.6935 
[0.7070]
5.8134 
[0.5617]
0.6953
2.2082
0.4366 
[0.8034]
0.8074 
[0.4569]
3.1477
[0.8710]
0.7575
2.2488
2.5958 
[0.2731]
0.6065 
[0.5561]
1.5026
[0.9822]
0.5828
2.1181
1.0438 
[0.5934]
1.3346 
[0.2807]
6.3093 
[0.5041]
0.5404
2.1911
2.6440 
[0.2671]
0.9962 
[0.3829]
4.2422 
[0.7515]
0.5618
2.2147
1.6846 
[0.4307]
2.0913 
[0.1438]
1.2822 
[0.9889]
0.6574
2.2893
0.5578 
[0.7566]
0.40403 
[0.7824]
6.3893 
[0.4973]
0.6099
2.2847
0.9015
[0.6372]
1.2670 
[0.2985]
4.1034 
[0.7678]
0.6327
2.2231
1.4372
[0.4874]
1.2341 
[0.3089]
5.3348 
[0.6192]
0.5808
2.2156
1.1960 
[0.5499]
0.8292 
[0.4476]
3.8458 
[0.7974]
0.5926
2.1636
1.3359 
[0.5312]
0.6592 
[0.5257]
8.5920 
[0.2833]
0.5968
2.2076
1.1500 
[0.5627]
0.3355 
[0.7189]
11.5745 
[0.1154]
Notes: AT, BE, FI, FR, GE and NL stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands respectively, while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public 
debt respectively.
  In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors proposed by Newey and West (1987).
 χ2
N, 
χ2
SC 
and χ2
H 
are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. 
The associated probability values are given in square brackets.
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Table 2b. Baseline empirical model. Peripheral countries. 
Panel A: Estimation results
GR IT PT SP
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd
gt-1
INFt
ΔHKt
ΔOPENt
POPGROt
GSt
Δdt
0.6952
(3.9309)
-0.3243
(-2.9755)
0.5144
(2.7254)
0.0137
(2.7124)
1.7489
(2.9646)
0.1952
(3.1206)
-0.5350
(-2.9417)
0.6638
(4.1203)
-0.2594
(-2.8716)
0.6712
(2.7652)
0.0625
(2.7536)
1.1643
(2.6804)
0.1448
(2.6441)
-0.3390
(-2.8192)
0.4374
(2.9916)
-0.2198
(-2.7857)
0.4085
(2.8206)
0.0114
(2.7110)
1.8628
(2.7968)
0.1434
(2.8193)
-0.1434
(-2.8576)
0.2579
(2.8508)
-0.0011
(-2.8693)
1.1121
(2.9447)
0.2369
(2.7934)
2.3133
(2.7567)
0.0430
(2.7352)
-0.1768
(-2.8635)
0.2969
(2.9651)
-0.0105
(2.9160)
1.1180
(2.9433)
0.2395
(2.8679)
2.1702
(2.8721)
0.0451
(2.7419)
-0.0767
(-2.9115)
0.1781
(2.9111)
-0.0471
(-2.8709)
1.2429
(2.8123)
0.1891
(2.8270)
2.0588
(2.8929)
0.0545
(2.8175)
-0.1502
(-2.8552)
0.4654
(2.9918)
-0.1321
(-2.8727)
0.9624
(2.8303)
0.1428
(2.7510)
1.4095
(2.9681)
0.1306
(2.9616)
-0.2175
(-2.9244)
0.5313
(3.4383)
-0.1062
(-2.7673)
0.9480
(2.8171)
0.1463
(2.7542)
0.5896
(2.8535)
0.0980
(2.9185)
-0.1593
(-2.9221)
0.2934
(2.9513)
-0.0528
(-2.8067)
0.0836
(2.7761)
0.1210
(2.7586)
0.0080
(2.7622)
0.1167
(3.3047)
-0.2279
(-3.1441)
0.7765
(3.1404)
-0.0481
(-2.9797)
0.7728
(2.7630)
0.2294
(2.7387)
0.3932
(2.7684)
0.0436
(2.8451)
-0.1444
(-2.9745)
0.8557
(3.3086)
-0.0767
(-2.9282)
0.5498
(2.8453)
0.2754
(2.7215)
0.1454
(2.8304)
0.0371
(2.7623)
-0.1826
(-2.8794)
0.4335
(2.9349)
-0.0219
(-2.8386)
1.1984
(2.8201)
0.1218
(2.7513)
0.7608
(2.8312)
0.1205
(2.7473)
-0.2050
(-2.7208)
Panel B: Model Diagnostics
Adjusted R2
DW Test
χ2N 
χ2SC
χ2H
0.5700
2.2119
0.7694 
[0.6809]
0.3660 
[0.6970]
3.8231 
[0.7999]
0.6180
2.1480
0.1594 
[0.9234]
0.7903 
[0.4643]
4.8579 
[0.6773]
0.6321
2.1987
0.4905 
[0.7825]
0.7345 
[0.4894]
7.6662
[0.3629]
0.5939
2.3144
0.2095 
[0.9006]
1.9360 
[0.1645]
6.6320 
[0.4682]
0.6028
2.2578
0.3395 
[0.8438]
3.2863 
[0.2212]
6.0811 
[0.5303]
0.6134
2.3077
0.1880 
[0.9131]
1.4282  
[0.2594]
6.4324 
[0.4903]
0.5928
2.2578
0.3395 
[0.8438]
3.2863 
[0.2212]
6.0811 
[0.5303]
0.6289
2.2229
0.7712 
[0.6801]
0.1957 
[0.8235]
3.8070 
[0.8017]
0.6377
2.2791
0.3485 
[0.8401]
0.9953 
[0.3833]
6.9531 
[0.4338]
0.6293
2.1571
1.7129 
[0.4249]
1.0187 
[0.3750]
9.6066 
[0.2120]
0.6365
2.1446
0.7618 
[0.6833]
1.2034 
[0.3163]
7.1328
[0.4152]
0.6979
2.2499
1.7816 
[0.4144]
2.3961 
[0.1109]
9.3144
[0.2309]
Notes:      GR, IT, PT and SP stand Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively, while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public debt respectively.
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors proposed by Newey and West (1987).
 χ2
N, 
χ2
SC 
and χ2
H 
are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. 
The associated probability values are given in square brackets.
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public debt, the marginal reaction ranges 
from -0.46 in Finland to -0.02 in Austria 
but, as in the baseline model, the average 
response does not differ between central 
and peripheral economies (-0.2 in both 
groups of countries). 
Therefore, the effects of debt accumulation 
on growth resulting from the asymmetric 
model also stress the fact that an increase 
in private debt has a higher detrimental 
effect on economic growth in peripheral 
than in central countries, while the 
effect is very similar in the two groups of 
countries if there is a rise in public debt. 
It is noticeable that in both the baseline 
and the asymmetric models an increase 
in private debt is especially harmful in 
Greece, while the effect of a public debt 
increase on Greek economic growth seems 
to be much lower. 
Tables 3 present some very important data 
regarding the effects of debt reduction on 
growth. On average, for the ten countries 
under study, a debt reduction has estimated 
marginal impacts of -0.3, -0.1 and -0.1 in 
the case of the household, government, 
and firm sectors respectively, indicating 
that while a reduction in nonfinancial 
corporations’ and public debt has a 
negligible effect on growth25, the response 
is relevant in the case of households. 
Nevertheless, this significant positive 
reaction clearly differs across countries, the 
average impact being higher in peripheral 
than in central countries. Specifically, the 
25   Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla Rivero (2017) also find 
the impact of  public debt deleverage on EMU countries’ 
economic growth to be insignificant.
7.2 Empirical results from the 
asymmetric model 
As explained above, the introduction of an 
indicator variable in the asymmetric model 
has the effect of splitting the variation of 
debt variable into two, allowing for an 
asymmetric response of growth to debt 
accumulation and relief.
The results reported in Panel A in 
Tables 3 suggest that, on average, this 
asymmetric effect exists for households 
and governments. However, while in the 
households’ sector the positive effect of a 
debt relief on growth (-0.3) is higher than 
the negative effect of a debt increase (-0.2), 
in the governments’ sector the negative 
effect of a debt increase on growth (-0.2) 
is higher than the positive impact of a 
debt reduction (-0.1). Conversely, for 
companies, the average marginal impact of 
a debt increase is the same as that of a debt 
reduction (-0.1).
Regarding the effects of debt accumulation, 
the marginal effect of a debt increase also 
differs across countries regardless of 
the type of debt, and similar patterns to 
those resulting from the baseline model 
are found. The marginal response of an 
increase of household debt ranges from 
-0.51 in Greece to -0.04 in the Netherlands 
and, on average, the marginal influence 
is higher in peripheral (-0.31) than in 
central countries (-0.16). If companies’ 
debt rises, the estimated marginal impact 
ranges from -0.39 in Greece to -0.04 in the 
Netherlands and, on average, it is higher in 
peripheral (-0.19) than in central countries 
(-0.11). In the case of a positive change in 
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Table 3a. Asymmetric model. Central countries
Panel A: Estimation results
AT BE FI FR GE NL
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd
gt-1
INFt
ΔHKt
ΔOPENt
POPGROt
GSt
ΔdtI(ΔdtI>0)
ΔdtI(ΔdtI<0)
0.3657
(2.9490)
-0.1129
(-2.7564)
0.0249
(2.8883)
0.2370
(4.2480)
0.0586
(2.8163)
0.0563
(2.7303)
-0.4313
(-2.9481)
-0.2222
(-2.8372)
0.4021
(2.8320)
-0.1749
(-3.3050)
0.9138
(2.8515)
0.2905
(4.1407)
0.2698
(2.8423)
0.0602
(2.7432)
-0.1025
(-2.8574)
-0.0577
(-2.9824)
0.3816
(2.8808)
-0.0832
(-2.8521)
0.2830
(2.9659)
0.2094
(4.1428)
0.0508
(2.8598)
0.0481
(2.9130)
-0.0207
(-2.9107)
-0.0362
(-2.8111)
0.0798
(2.9606)
-0.2622
(-2.8887)
1.7427
(2.8282)
0.1263
(3.5361)
1.9072
(2.9628)
0.1046
(4.4203)
-0.0859
(-2.9808)
-0.0545
(-2.8248)
0.1125
(2.8786)
-0.2688
(-3.1129)
1.5681
(2.8927)
0.1370
(3.3407)
1.8289
(2.8571)
0.1095
(4.6189)
-0.0835
(-2.9022)
-0.0501
(-2.8581)
0.0797
(2.8711)
-0.0731
(-2.7508)
2.0416
(2.7687)
0.0798
(2.8043)
2.0102
(2.9043)
0.1073
(4.0988)
-0.2812
(-2.9342)
-0.1272
(-2.8114)
0.0123
(2.9758)
-0.2736
(-2.8753)
1.0187
(2.7954)
0.2592
(3.1049)
13.3649
(3.8480)
0.2679
(4.5984)
-0.2821
(-2.9440)
-0.4203
(-2.8666)
0.0640
(2.8652)
-0.2725
(-2.9319)
0.8453
(2.8230)
0.4393
(4.2010)
9.9146
(3.5380)
0.2232
(4.3908)
-0.2843
(-3.5385)
-0.1168
(-2.9214)
0.3064
(2.9479)
-0.2136
(-2.8671)
0.1954
(2.8136)
0.2733
(4.1131)
4.9146
(2.7617)
0.1786
(3.9671)
-0.4551
(-3.4399)
-0.4298
(-2.9103)
0.4595
(3.2191)
-0.0011
(-2.9168)
1.6862
(2.7948)
0.2569
(3.0501)
1.3537
(2.9017)
0.0118
(2.8753)
-0.0448
(-2.9695)
-0.1304
(-2.9077)
0.4925
(3.3180)
-0.0279
(-2.9490)
1.6824
(2.8608)
0.2869
(3.7587)
1.6559
(2.8811)
0.0157
(2.8413)
-0.0891
(-2.9471)
-0.1945
(-2.8404)
0.1418
(2.9150)
-0.0228
(-2.8448)
1.1022
(2.8332)
0.1643
(2.7756)
0.9861
(2.8522)
0.0732
(2.9790)
-0.3447
(-3.0785)
-0.0985
(-2.9057)
0.1679
(3.1979)
-0.2029
(-2.9464)
1.8118
(2.8499)
0.3957
(5.5781)
0.7954
(2.8617)
0.0024
(2.9148)
-0.0832
(-2.9225)
-0.0516
(-2.8766)
0.2163
(2.9536)
-0.1306
(-2.8881)
1.8302
(2.8554)
0.4000
(5.1659)
0.8660
(2.8606)
0.0099
(2.8916)
-0.0503
(-2.9150)
-0.1067
(-2.9253)
0.1602
(2.9114)
-0.1963
(-2.9298)
1.3782
(2.8755)
0.3928
(5.2092)
0.9966
(2.8490)
0.0104
(2.9307)
-0.1537
(-2.8596)
-0.0471
(-2.8609)
0.4459
(3.6746)
-0.4915
(-3.2724)
1.8799
(2.8559)
0.1584
(4.5974)
0.2058
(2.8463)
0.1018
(3.2200)
-0.0412
(-2.9726)
-0.0521
(-3.6277)
0.5417
(3.7397)
-0.4246
(-2.9111)
0.3647
(2.8585)
0.1194
(2.8403)
0.9105
(2.7752)
0.0408
(2.8749)
-0.0419
(-2.8362)
-0.0371
(-2.8378)
0.4607
(2.9083)
-0.3775
(-2.9265)
0.7315
(2.8555)
0.1106
(2.8568)
0.6852
(2.7641)
0.0567
(2.8662)
-0.0459
(-2.9155)
-0.0220
(-2.8683)
Panel B: Model Diagnostics
Adjusted R2
DW Test
χ2N 
χ2SC
χ2H
0.6446
2.3823
2.4205 
[0.2908]
0.2994 
[0.7439]
9.3411 
[0.2366]
0.6486
2.2169
0.3067
[0.8578]
0.8219 
[0.4511]
10.7826 
[0.2143]
0.6597
2.1792
0.3595
[0.8355]
0.5716 
[0.5719]
10.5837 
[0.2264]
0.5807
2.3471
2.6114
[0.2663]
0.6508
[0.5852]
4.8270 
[0.7759]
0.5930
2.2247
2.5000
[0.2864]
0.6783
[0.5811]
5.3436 
[0.7203]
0.6256
2.1669
0.1005
[0.9948]
1.5696
[0.2279]
5.3384 
[0.7209]
0.6760
2.3435
1.2791 
[05275]
0.6458 
[0.6557]
5.7081 
[0.6799]
0.7009
2.2827
0.0517 
[0.9745]
0.7515 
[0.4775]
3.1780 
[0.9227]
0.7452
2.2405
2.5186 
[0.2639]
1.0305 
[0.3759]
1.4742 
[0.9931]
0.6248
2.2702
0.9232 
[0.6393]
0.9862 
[0.3867]
6.4897 
[0.5926]
0.6353
2.2114
2.9845 
[0.2248]
0.7671
[0.4750]
4.9780 
[0.7599]
0.6455
2.2114
2.3810 
[0.3041]
1.2462
[0.3049]
2.3561 
[0.9681]
0.6747
2.4112
0.5704 
[0.7519]
0.6531 
[0.6209]
6.0860 
[0.6376]
0.6524
2.2875
0.7583 
[0.6845]
0.0075 
[0.9926]
3.9572 
[0.8610]
0.6633
2.2636
1.4306 
[0.4890]
1.2583 
[0.3047]
4.9919 
[0.7584]
0.6272
2.2143
1.5059 
[0.4710]
0.1453 
[0.8654]
11.0725 
[0.1976]
0.6242
2.2186
1.7202 
[0.5149]
1.3659 
[0.2735]
8.7312 
[0.3655]
0.6470
2.2155
1.8202 
[0.5011]
0.3256 
[0.7251]
12.6654 
[0.1239]
Notes: AT, BE, FI, FR, GE and NL stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands respectively; while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public 
debt respectively.
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors proposed by Newey and West (1987). 
χ2
N, 
χ2
SC 
and χ2
H 
are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. 
The associated probability values are given in square brackets.
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                Table 3b. Asymmetric model. Peripheral countries. 
Panel A: Estimation results
GR IT PT SP
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd
gt-1
INFt
ΔHKt
ΔOPENt
POPGROt
GSt
ΔdtI(ΔdtI>0)
ΔdtI(ΔdtI<0)
0.5992
(2.9723)
-0.3849
(-3.1451)
0.3057
(2.7545)
0.0108
(2.7099)
1.4382
(2.8082)
0.2585
(3.1210)
-0.5137
(-2.8232)
-0.4800
(-2.7953)
0.6534
(2.9536)
-0.2755
(-2.7661)
0.1226
(2.8327)
0.1139
(2.9499)
1.6757
(2.9766)
0.1714
(2.8916)
-0.3900
(-2.9150)
-0.0033
(-2.8117)
0.1392
(2.9325)
-0.3450
(-2.9123)
0.1514
(2.8514)
0.0120
(2.7406)
1.8957
(2.8381)
0.2795
(2.9548)
-0.2763
(-2.9596)
-0.0526
(-2.8463)
0.2557
(2.8257)
-0.0104
(-2.7827)
0.7764
(2.7573)
0.2613
(3.5372)
2.3696
(2.7549)
0.0642
(2.7266)
-0.2561
(-2.9234)
-0.1878
(-3.2643)
0.2899
(2.8777)
-0.0158
(-2.8912)
1.5046
(2.7722)
0.2313
(2.8518)
2.2084
(2.8053)
0.0366
(2.9189)
-0.1737
(-2.8325)
-0.0751
(-2.8960)
0.1323
(2.8218)
-0.0346
(-2.7526)
0.9579
(2.8658)
0.1879
(2.9468)
2.2395
(2.8313)
0.0873
(2.8239)
-0.2400
(-2.9501)
-0.1760
(-2.8649)
0.4766
(3.0387)
-0.1370
(-2.9267)
1.0638
(2.9088)
0.1517
(2.7659)
1.2213
(2.8256)
0.1462
(2.7403)
-0.2666
(-2.9443)
-0.4112
(-2.8545)
0.5790
(2.9794)
-0.1109
(-2.9698)
0.8110
(2.7454)
0.1628
(2.8269)
0.6516
(2.7632)
0.0577
(2.8405)
-0.0870
(-2.7413)
-0.0706
(-2.8561)
0.3119
(2.9110)
-0.0674
(-2.7836)
0.2826
(2.7427)
0.1237
(2.8510)
0.0031
(2.7428)
0.1376
(3.8611)
-0.2828
(-3.5280)
-0.1343
(-2.8546)
0.8802
(3.0305)
-0.0114
(-2.9152)
0.7905
(2.7667)
0.1974
(2.8723)
0.3964
(2.7170)
0.0050
(2.8124)
-0.1924
(-2.9296)
-0.7396
(-2.8585)
0.8926
(3.0503)
-0.1419
(-2.9268)
0.9224
(2.8269)
0.2847
(3.0860)
0.1359
(2.8776)
0.0191
(2.7189)
-0.0981
(-2.7754)
-0.0728
(-2.9720)
0.4381
(2.8850)
-0.0285
(-2.8435)
1.2093
(2.9189)
0.1221
(2.7902)
0.7131
(2.8489)
0.1240
(3.3650)
-0.1129
(-3.1691)
-0.0376
(-2.9599)
Panel B: Model Diagnostics
Adjusted R2
DW Test
χ2N 
χ2SC
χ2H
0.5824
2.3108
0.7340 
[0.6928]
0.3257 
[0.7251]
4.5151 
[0.8070]
0.6550
2.2684
0.1803 
[0.9138]
0.5302 
[0.7203]
4.9322 
[0.7648]
0.7370
2.2910
1.3648 
[0.5054]
1.6182 
[0.2183]
0.6884 
[0.9996]
0.6628
2.2083
0.2160 
[0.8976]
1.7222 
[0.1992]
6.7924 
[0.5592]
0.6021
2.2837
0.9752 
[0.6138]
1.6267 
[0.2167]
5.9522 
[0.6526]
0.6201
2.3025
0.5109 
[0.7746]
1.0837 
[0.3550]
4.4272 
[0.8167]
0.6121
2.2117
0.5135 
[0.7736]
0.4286 
[0.6561]
5.0263 
[0.7548]
0.6543
2.1382
1.4850 
[0.4759]
0.3776 
[0.8312]
4.2221 
[0.8365]
0.6647
2.1709
2.4805 
[0.2893]
0.5417 
[0.5941]
8.6515 
[0.2725]
0.6136
2.3208
0.1092 
[0.9469]
0.0938 
[0.9108
7.4995 
[0.4838]
0.6395
2.1564
1.4116 
[0.4937]
1.2985 
[0.2907]
2.9953 
[0.9347]
0.6873
2.2221
1.4624 
[0.5637]
0.9362 
[0.4086]
8.8562 
[0.3546]
Notes:     GR, IT, PT and SP stand Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively; while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public debt respectively.
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors proposed by Newey and West (1987).
χ2
N, 
χ2
SC 
and χ2
H 
are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. 
The associated probability values are given in square brackets.
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As stated above, the effects of households’ 
debt relief in central EMU countries (Table 
3a) are lower than in peripheral economies. 
In fact, a debt reduction only presents 
a positive relevant effect in Finland and 
Austria.
Finally, notice that we have conducted 
diagnostic tests in order to see whether 
our results are free from problems of 
serial autocorrelation, heteroskedasticity 
and nonlinearity of residuals. As can be 
seen in Panel B of Tables 3, we found that 
none of these problems are present in 
our estimates. Additionally, the estimated 
adjusted R2 statistics seem to suggest that 
a considerable fraction of the variance 
of the dependent variable is explained 
by the independent variables used in the 
regressions.
7.3. Empirical results from the threshold 
model 
Panels A in Tables 4a and 4b show26 the 
results from the threshold model. As in the 
asymmetric model, an indicator variable 
has been introduced which splits the effect 
of the debt change into two, thus allowing 
for the impact to differ below and above 
the threshold detected.
Some interesting observations can also be 
drawn from Tables 4. First, it is noticeable 
that above the estimated threshold, on 
average, the estimated negative effect of an 
increase in public debt on growth (-0.2) is 
similar to the one found using the baseline 
26  As can be seen in Panel B in Tables 4, the 
regressions fit reasonably well in terms of  adjusted R2 and 
they pass the diagnostic tests against non-normal errors, 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
marginal impact of debt deleveraging 
in the household sector presents values 
of -0.74, -0.48, -0.41 and -0.19 in Spain, 
Greece, Portugal and Italy respectively. 
Consequently, in view of these results 
and considering that households’ final 
consumption expenditure is the most 
important component of GDP (around 
50%) in the countries under study, it 
is essential to point out that the huge 
increase in households’ indebtedness 
(close to 160% over the last 36 years, 
mainly due to mortgage loans) has 
represented a significant impediment for 
economic growth, since it has crowded 
out consumption. Therefore, a reduction 
in households’ debt (especially in EMU 
peripheral countries) may be crucial to 
stimulate consumption and growth; as the 
literature has stressed, households’ debt 
plays a very important role in shaping 
the business cycle. Jordà et al. (2013) 
show that the presence of a high level of 
household debt leads to deeper recessions, 
while Mian et al. (2013) report the 
channel through which this might happen. 
Specifically, the latter authors highlight the 
role of household debt in explaining the 
large decline in U.S. consumption during 
the 2006-2009 period. In particular, since 
they find that the marginal propensity 
to consume is much higher for poorer 
households or those with higher leverage, 
their results suggest that the consequences 
of housing wealth decline on aggregate 
consumption will be more severe the 
higher the level of leverage in the housing 
sector.  
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Table 4a. Threshold model. Central countries.
Panel A: Estimation results
AT BE FI FR GE NL
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd
gt-1
INFt
ΔHKt
ΔOPENt
POPGROt
GSt
ΔdtI(dt>d*)
ΔdtI(dt<d*)
d*
0.3812
(2.9578)
-0.1579
(-2.9175)
1.0575
(2.8491)
0.2201
(4.4324)
0.0386
(2.8646)
0.0411
(2.8945)
-0.2771
(-2.9968)
0.1290
(2.8791)
39%
0.4619
(3.5729)
-0.1228
(-2.9232)
1.1273
(2.8247)
0.2860
(4.5622)
0.0774
(2.7838)
0.0622
(2.7524)
-0.2113
(-3.2864)
0.0542
(2.8612)
65%
0.3980
(2.8935)
-0.1701
(-2.8547)
0.6369
(2.9444)
0.2524
(3.5412)
0.7719
(2.8561)
0.0431
(2.8156)
-0.0524
(-2.9410)
0.0398
(2.8345)
60%
0.0826
(2.9650)
-0.2059
(-2.8615)
1.5200
(2.8730)
0.1326
(2.9958)
1.7896
(2.8434)
0.0990
(4.2681)
-0.2635
(-2.9614)
0.0965
(2.8711)
40%
0.1164
(2.9329)
-0.2556
(-2.9776)
1.4224
(2.8646)
0.1350
(3.8539)
1.6550
(2.7783)
0.1059
(4.5304)
-0.0549
(-2.8420)
0.0066
(2.8115)
110%
0.1468
(2.9207)
-0.1151
(-2.8376)
1.7559
(2.7655)
0.1005
(3.2246)
1.5868
(2.8359)
0.0829
(3.4266)
-0.0341
(-2.8473)
0.0061
(2.7638)
96%
0.0060
(2.9711)
-0.3094
(-2.8842)
0.8464
(2.7860)
0.2582
(3.1223)
13.3835
(3.9879)
0.2690
(4.7280)
-0.3172
(-2.8879)
0.7080
(2.8324)
34%
0.0349
(2.9264)
-0.3033
(-2.9407)
1.0339
(2.8702)
0.4096
(4.2784)
10.9080
(3.9674)
0.2224
(5.0413)
-0.5295
(-3.7953)
0.2433
(2.8659)
105%
0.2867
(2.8979)
-0.2321
(-2.8635)
0.0700
(2.8496)
0.2632
(4.1254)
4.9110
(2.7667)
0.1733
(4.0169)
-0.4311
(-3.3641)
0.2408
(3.1271)
40%
0.4901
(3.3965)
-0.0713
(-2.8191)
1.7175
(2.8853)
0.2517
(3.5592)
1.0355
(2.7924)
0.0018
(2.8179)
-0.2782
(-2.8735)
0.1466
(2.9690)
40%
0.3768
(2.9565)
-0.0368
(-2.8378)
1.6387
(2.8510)
0.2409
(3.1871)
1.6401
(2.8374)
0.0033
(2.8937)
-0.2908
(-2.9307)
0.0570
(2.8345)
135%
0.1592
(2.9171)
-0.1219
(-2.8480)
0.9103
(2.8106)
0.1602
(2.8723)
0.0882
(2.7586)
0.0889
(2.8341)
-0.2864
(-3.6270)
0.0487
(2.8674)
35%
0.1382
(3.1128)
-0.2243
(-2.9366)
2.0515
(2.9170)
0.3854
(5.6486)
0.8180
(2.8716)
0.0006
(2.9287)
-0.1355
(-2.8793)
0.0936
(2.8779)
65%
0.2537
(2.8757)
-0.1509
(-2.9003)
1.7604
(2.9799)
0.4122
(5.1063)
0.9903
(2.8696)
0.0060
(2.8250)
-0.0211
(-2.9365)
0.0280
(2.9707)
60%
0.0676
(2.9189)
-0.2085
(-2.9701)
1.6316
(2.9344)
0.3980
(3.9811)
0.8069
(2.7638)
0.0022
(2.9583)
-0.1770
(-2.9165)
0.0571
(3.1712)
40%
0.5486
(3.7974)
-0.3287
(-2.9541)
0.7420
(2.7527)
0.1377
(3.2575)
0.2997
(2.8640)
0.0469
(2.8394)
-0.0337
(-2.9461)
0.3754
(2.9511)
47%
0.5662
(3.9266)
-0.4401
(-2.9183)
0.0409
(2.8476)
0.1223
(2.8468)
0.8598
(2.9459)
0.0454
(2.8733)
-0.0748
(-2.8782)
0.0230
(2.8325)
102%
0.4578
(3.3624)
-0.4506
(-2.9487)
0.8853
(2.8715)
0.1179
(3.2622)
0.7978
(2.7516)
0.0642
(2.8695)
-0.2592
(-2.9513)
0.0218
(2.8203)
60%
Panel B: Model Diagnostics
Adjusted R2
DW Test
χ2N 
χ2SC
χ2H
0.6733
2.2078
0.9964
[0.6076]
0.6195 
[0.5463]
4.7135 
[0.7650]
0.6641
2.1265
1.4591 
[0.4821]
0.4473 
[0.6444]
9.0544
[0.3377]
0.6816
2.1861
0.2813 
[0.8688]
0.4990 
[0.6130]
7.7119
[0.4614]
0.6662
2.3727
0.6388
[0.7283]
1.1391
[0.3362]
4.4394
[0.8155]
0.5728
2.1528
0.7440
[0.6833]
2.2545
[0.2287]
5.8618
 [0.6627]
0.6678
2.1871
0.9011
[0.6373]
1.8948
[0.1713]
3.2244
 [0.9195]
0.6778
2.4117
0.7667 
[0.6867]
0.6297 
[0.6924]
7.6402
[0.4694]
0.7411
2.2471
0.0397 
[0.9804]
0.5488 
[0.5844]
3.0921 
[0.9284]
0.7571
2.2131
2.2067 
[0.3318]
1.5578 
[0.2392]
1.6446 
[0.9900]
0.6767
2.2754
1.2756 
[0.5285]
1.4275 
[0.2588]
6.3419 
[0.6090]
0.5873
2.2233
1.7358 
[0.4198]
0.9418 
[0.4033]
4.8857 
[0.7697]
0.6786
2.1881
2.0208 
[0.3841]
1.0884 
[0.3522]
0.9549 
[0.9985]
0.6979
2.3312
0.7933 
[0.6726]
1.0565 
[0.3534]
6.8825 
[0.5494]
0.6632
2.2093
0.9080 
[0.6351]
1.1253 
[0.3404]
4.1841 
[0.8401]
0.6773
2.2112
1.0586 
[0.5890]
0.7799 
[0.4693]
3.3197 
[0.9127]
0.6588
2.2363
0.6652 
[0.6357]
1.1263 
[0.3401]
10.5322 
[0.2296]
0.6239
2.2180
0.7351 
[0.6517]
1.2661 
[0.3009]
7.9127 
[0.4420]
0.6454
2.2164
0.7813
[0.64111
1.0447 
[0.3667]
11.9384 
[0.2168]Notes:   AT, BE, FI, FR, GE and NL stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands respectively; while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public 
debt respectively.
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors d* indicates the estimated threshold in the debt/GDP ratio.  
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors proposed by Newey and West (1987). χ2
N, 
χ2
SC 
and χ2
H 
are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. The associated probability values are given in square brackets.
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Table 4b. Threshold model. Peripheral countries. 
Panel A: Estimation results
GR IT PT SP
hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd hd cd pd
gt-1
INFt
ΔHKt
ΔOPENt
POPGROt
GSt
ΔdtI(ΔdtI>0)
ΔdtI(ΔdtI<0)
d*
0.6956
(3.8584)
-0.3282
(-2.7342)
0.5166
(2.7251)
0.0133
(2.8119)
1.7723
(2.9354)
0.1976
(2.7586)
-0.7607
(-2.9171)
0.5346
(2.8994)
32%
0.7073
(4.4791)
-0.2385
(-2.7425)
0.4972
(2.7249)
0.0462
(2.7408)
1.8452
(2.8378)
0.1094
(2.9228)
-0.5550
(-2.8235)
0.0580
(2.7648)
52%
0.4205
(2.7976)
-0.3245
(-2.9230)
0.1976
(2.8103)
0.0044
(2.7847)
2.7994
(2.7619)
0.1529
(2.9539)
-0.1440
(-2.9542)
0.0464
(2.8711)
71%
0.1655
(2.8455)
-0.0572
(-2.7762)
1.0427
(2.7648)
0.3049
(4.1812)
1.8146
(2.7612)
0.0168
(2.7613)
-0.1172
(-2.9741)
0.7293
(3.7289)
19%
0.2471
(2.9131)
-0.0292
(-2.8405)
1.3297
(2.9124)
0.2144
(2.8369)
2.2311
(2.8268)
0.0358
(2.8988)
-0.1842
(-2.9172)
0.1301
(2.8578)
61%
0.2426
(2.8477)
-0.0900
(-2.8888)
1.0141
(2.7499)
0.2509
(3.1804)
1.5816
(2.7537)
0.0596
(2.9162)
-0.2821
(-2.9449)
0.1097
(2.8614)
90%
0.4581
(2.9148)
-0.1163
(-2.8568
0.8297
(2.7768)
0.1279
(2.7312)
1.2847
(2.8695)
0.1256
(2.9472)
-0.1764
(-2.9543)
0.3889
(2.8335)
33%
0.4709
(2.9488)
-0.0950
(-2.8398)
1.0094
(2.7957)
0.1281
(2.7735)
0.6516
(2.7598)
0.0911
(2.8323)
-0.1738
(-2.8508)
0.2181
(2.7654)
80%
0.3036
(2.9465)
-0.0120
(-2.7699)
0.0863
(2.8133)
0.1374
2.7649)
0.3953
(2.7449)
0.0949
(2.8475)
-0.2074
(-2.9400)
0.0296
(2.8110)
50%
0.8802
(3.0305)
-0.0114
(-2.9152)
0.7905
(2.7667)
0.1974
(2.8723)
0.3964
(2.7170)
0.0050
(2.8124)
-0.1924
(-2.9296)
-0.7396
(-2.8585)
40%
0.8533
(3.1630)
-0.0890
(-2.9202)
0.7258
(2.8614)
0.3062
(3.0701)
0.1754
(2.7349)
0.0355
(2.8211)
-0.1846
(-2.9342)
0.2248
(2.8698)
95%
0.3218
(2.8527)
-0.1132
(-2.7810)
1.2688
(2.7901)
0.1490
(2.0466)
0.4447
(2.7594)
0.1465
(2.9624)
-0.2970
(-2.9764)
0.0313
(2.8763)
50%
Panel B: Model Diagnostics
Adjusted R2
DW Test
χ2N 
χ2SC
χ2H
0.6316
2.3005
2.2877 
[0.3186]
0.8302 
[0.4476]
6.2949 
[0.6142]
0.6824
2.1822
0.7561 
[0.6852]
1.6307
[0.2159]
3.1782 
[0.9227]
0.7103
2.1493
0.0312 
[0.9845]
0.4180
[0.6629]
7.6419 
[0.4692]
0.6112
2.2567
2.5389 
[0.2810]
1.6747 
[0.2077]
3.7351 
[0.8802]
0.6404
2.2311
0.3742 
[0.8294]
0.8491 
[0.4398]
5.8636 
[0.6625]
0.6714
2.2381
1.1246 
[0.5448]
1.5284 
[0.2365]
6.8805 
[0.5496]
0.6415
2.3691
0.7757
[0.6785]
0.3948 
[0.6779]
7.5708 
[0.4765]
0.6762
2.2233
0.0647 
[0.9682]
1.0446 
[0.3667]
3.0960 
[0.9282]
0.6762
2.2191
0.1476 
[0.9289]
1.0446 
[0.3667]
3.0960 
[0.9282]
0.6568
2.3149
0.7465 
[0.6996]
0.7698 
[0.4738]
6.4329 
[0.5989]
0.6607
2.2845
1.1876 
[0.5612]
0.7427 
[0.4861]
3.4514 
[0.9029]
0.7887
2.2153
1.0470 
[0.5925]
0.7515 
[0.4833]
3.8619 
[0.8694]
Notes:     GR, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively, while hd, cd and pd stand for household, corporate and public debt respectively.
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors d* indicates the estimated threshold in the debt/GDP ratio.  
 In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown, based on the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard 
errors proposed by Newey and West (1987). χ2
N, 
χ2
SC 
and χ2
H 
are the Jarque-Bera test for normality, the Breusch-Godfrey LM test for second-order serial correlation and the 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test for heteroskedasticity. The associated probability values are given in square brackets.
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peripheral and 96% in central countries) 
and the marginal impacts above them 
are very high in some of these peripheral 
economies (e.g., Greece presents a marginal 
impact of -0.76 and -0.55 beyond the 32% 
and 52% turning point for households’ 
and firms’ debt respectively). Therefore, 
these results suggest that an increase in 
households’ debt (especially in peripheral 
countries) exerts a higher detrimental 
effect on growth than a rise in nonfinancial 
corporations’ debt. Mian and Sufi (2017) 
show that an increase in the household 
debt-to-GDP predicts lower subsequent 
GDP growth and higher unemployment, 
while Jordà et al. (2016b) find that more 
mortgage-intensive credit expansions tend 
to be followed by deeper recessions and 
slower recoveries.
Fourth, analysing the results of the 
threshold model for the public sector, we 
find that while the tipping point is lower 
in central (55%) than in peripheral (65%) 
countries, the marginal impact beyond 
that point is similar in the two group 
of countries (around -0.2). Focusing on 
peripheral countries (Table 4b), thresholds 
are 90%, 71%, 50% and 50% in Italy, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, while marginal 
impacts range from -0.3 in Spain and Italy 
to -0.2 in Portugal and -0.1 in Greece. 
All in all, Tables 4 indicate that while public 
debt thresholds are higher in peripheral 
than in central countries, private debt 
thresholds are higher in core EMU 
countries. These results suggest that while 
peripheral countries might have a higher 
capacity to increase public indebtedness 
or the asymmetric model. However, the 
average negative reaction to an increase 
in private debt (both households and 
companies) is higher above the detected 
tipping point in the threshold model than 
in the two previous models. In the case of 
households, the average marginal impact 
increases from -0.2 to -0.3, while in the 
case of nonfinancial corporations it rises 
from -0.1 up to -0.2.
Second, on average, the highest thresholds 
are found for corporations’ debt (87%), 
followed by public debt (59%) and 
households’ debt (39%). Our findings 
reflect the fact that firms’ debt is, on 
average, twice as high as households’ 
debt and around one third higher than 
that of the public sector during the 1980-
2015 period (see Figure 2 and Table 1). 
According to our results, firms have greater 
room for manoeuvre to increase the level 
of indebtedness than the other sectors, 
and the public sector has a greater margin 
than households. 
Third, focusing on the private sector, 
not only are debt thresholds lower for 
households’ debt rather than for firms’ 
debt, but also the average marginal effect 
(-0.3) of a household debt increase on 
growth beyond the tipping point is higher 
than that of companies (-0.2). Moreover, 
in the two private sectors, thresholds are 
lower in peripheral than in central EMU 
countries (households’ debt thresholds 
present average values of 31% and 44% 
in peripheral and central countries 
respectively, while the average values 
of firms’ debt thresholds are 72% in 
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debt should be sources of concern when 
they are high and register an upward trend. 
This paper aimed to fill the existing 
gap in the literature by assessing the 
effect of all forms of nonfinancial debt 
(households, nonfinancial corporations 
and governments) on economic growth 
in euro-area countries. To do so, we used 
a methodology that explicitly takes into 
account the possible heterogeneity (see, 
e.g., Erberhart and Presbitero, 2015 or 
Chudick et al., 2017) in the relationship 
between each source of nonfinancial debt 
and growth across euro-area countries. In 
particular, our analytical strategy has rested 
on the estimation of an equation based on 
the empirical growth literature augmented 
by debt to assess whether the latter has an 
impact on growth over and above other 
determinants. So, after ensuring that all 
the variables in the model have the same 
order of integration, and to provide a 
broad view of the debt-growth nexus, we 
successively estimated three models (a 
baseline, an asymmetric and a threshold 
model) for each of the ten countries in 
our sample and, following Cecchetti et al. 
(2011), we treated the different types of 
borrowers – households, corporations and 
governments – separately.
Summing up, the results from both the 
baseline and the asymmetric model 
suggest that although the effects on 
nonfinancial debt accumulation clearly 
differ across countries, on average the 
highest marginal impact of a debt rise 
corresponds to the household and public 
sector. Furthermore, an increase in private 
than central ones, in the case of private 
indebtedness central countries are in a 
better position to increase it. Consequently, 
public debt accumulation might exert a more harmful effect on central euro-
area countries’ economic growth, but the 
detrimental effect of an increase in private 
debt seems to be higher in peripheral 
countries. These results suggest that 
peripheral countries especially should 
be aware of the adverse consequences of 
private debt accumulation. Rather than 
disregarding private sector leveraging, 
they should pay it as much attention as 
they already do to public debt.
8. Concluding remarks
Total nonfinancial debt as a percentage of 
GDP, as well as its components, rose steadily 
for much of the 1980-2015 period. Starting 
at a relatively modest 147 percent of GDP in 
1980, 36 years later total nonfinancial debt 
had reached 304 per cent of GDP in euro-
area countries and, of this percentage, only 
one third corresponds to the public sector. 
In 2015 about two-thirds of total euro-area 
countries’ nonfinancial debt has its origin 
in the private sector (both households 
and companies). However, while the 
unprecedented increase in public debt 
across EMU countries has raised serious 
concerns among economists about both its 
sustainability and its impact on economic 
growth, they have taken a more nuanced 
position regarding the risks of private 
debt accumulation, despite its magnitude. 
Nevertheless, all forms of nonfinancial 
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central counterparts.  
Finally, it is noticeable that the highest 
thresholds are found for corporate debt 
(87%), followed by public debt (59%) and 
household debt (39%). Focusing on the 
private sector, not only are debt thresholds 
lower for households rather than for firms, 
but also, beyond the detected tipping point, 
the average marginal effect of a household 
debt increase on growth is higher than that 
of companies’ debt. Moreover, in the two 
private sectors, thresholds are lower in 
peripheral than in central EMU countries 
and the marginal impact above them is 
very high in some of these peripheral 
economies. Conversely, in the public sector 
we find lower thresholds in central than in 
peripheral countries. 
Therefore, our findings seem to suggest that 
EMU central countries are more tolerant 
of a private debt increase than peripheral 
economies, and that the negative potential 
effect is higher in peripheral Member States 
than in core countries. Yet, although the 
warning signs of increased private leverage in the run-up to the crisis of 2008 were 
largely ignored (especially in peripheral 
countries), euro-area economies should 
now be aware of the adverse consequences 
of private debt accumulation (in particular, 
in the household sector) and should be as 
concerned by private sector leveraging as 
they are by public debt. 
Our results have significant policy 
implications. Empirical evidence on the 
impact of nonfinancial debt on economic 
growth helps to inform policy and stresses 
debt is more harmful in peripheral than in 
central EMU countries, while the average 
effect of a rise in public debt does not differ 
between these two groups of countries. 
Focusing on the effects of a debt increase 
beyond the turning point estimated in the 
threshold model, it is noticeable that above 
the estimated threshold, on average the 
negative effect of an increase in public debt 
on growth is similar to the one found using 
the baseline or the asymmetric model. 
However, the average negative reaction to 
an increase in private debt is higher above 
the detected tipping point in the threshold 
model than in the two previous ones. As a 
result, in the threshold model the highest 
marginal impact of a debt increase beyond 
the turning point corresponds to the 
household sector.
Our results also suggest that there exists 
an asymmetric effect for the household 
and government sectors. However, while in 
the households’ sector the positive effect 
of a debt reduction on growth is higher 
than the negative effects of a debt increase, 
in the public sector the negative effect of 
a debt increase on growth is higher than 
the positive impact of a debt reduction. 
Furthermore, our findings indicate 
that while a reduction in nonfinancial 
corporations’ or governments’ debt has a 
negligible effect on growth, the response 
is relevant in the case of households. 
Nevertheless, the significant positive 
reaction of households’ debt deleverage 
clearly differs across countries, the 
average impact being higher in peripheral 
countries (especially in Spain) than in their 
32
the importance of monitoring both private 
and public debt to stimulate economic 
growth. Additionally, the heterogeneous 
relationships detected in the debt-growth 
nexus suggest that the pace of leveraging 
should be adapted to the differences in 
debt tolerance and impact in each EMU 
country; therefore, rigid and uniform 
criteria are not advisable when addressing 
the necessary adjustments. 
Our contribution also provides guidance 
for theoretical models that seek to study 
the consequences of debt on economic 
growth. We show that private debt matters 
as well as public debt. Thus, the growing 
macroeconomic literature should focus 
more closely on private indebtedness 
when studying the capacity of an economy 
to produce goods and services over time in 
order to increase the validity and viability 
of these models and their ability to offer a systematic structural interpretation of 
economic reality.
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 Appendix 1: Definition of the explanatory variables and data sources
Variable Description Source
Real growth rate (gt) Growth rate of  real per capita GDP (annual %) World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Level of  Output (yt) Per capita Gross domestic product at 2010 market prices AMECO, extended to 2015 using International Monetary Fund 
(2016b)
Household debt-to-GDP ratio (hdt) Household and non-profit institutions serving households debt 
(all liabilities) as percentage of  GDP
Cecchetti et al. (2011) extended to 2015 using AMECO
http://www.bis.org/publ/work352_data.xls 
Nonfinancial corporate debt-to-
GDP ratio (cdt)
Nonfinancial corporate debt (all liabilities less shares and other 
equity) as percentage of  GDP
Cecchetti et al. (2011) extended to 2015 using AMECO
http://www.bis.org/publ/work352_data.xls
Public debt-to-GDP ratio (pdt) Ratio of  public debt to GDP AMECO and International Monetary Fund (2016b)
Population growth (POPGRt) Population growth (annual %) World Development Indicators (World Bank)
GS-to-GDP ratio (GSt) Ratio of  gross savings to GDP (%) World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Human capital (HKt) Life expectancy at birth, total (years) World Development Indicators (World Bank)
Openess (OPENt) Absolute sum of  exports and imports over GDP World Development Indicators (World Bank) 
Inflation (INFt) Inflation as measured by the consumer price index 
 (annual %)
World Development Indicators (World Bank),  
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